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2Abstract:
FDA involvement in the policy space of direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising of prescription drugs
raises the question whether state-law based lawsuits based on such advertising are preempted. Congress
and the Supreme Court have not provided helpful guidance. The FDA has recently taken an aggressive
stance favoring preemption. The lower courts that have considered the issue in areas of (1) failure-to-warn
claims, (2) fraud and false advertising claims, and (3) claims for speciﬁc relief. The lower courts have
reached mixed results, though the majority seem to disfavor preemption. This paper argues that, for a
variety of reasons, most state-law based claims founded on DTC advertising should be preempted under
either “implied” preemption doctrine or as obstacles to the FDA’s program of encouraging optimal drug use.
1.
Introduction
Direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising has become an important aspect of the prescription drug industry;
in 2001, DTC advertising expenditures reached $2.7 billion.1 This has led to increased scrutiny of DTC
advertising from many sources, including consumer advocacy groups, individual consumers, and academic
commentators.2 In addition, state courts and juries also have begun to scrutinize the practice as lawsuits
asserting state law causes of action based upon DTC advertising have become more common. Since—and
possibly in response to—this development, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has taken a more
active role in addressing DTC advertising. The FDA’s higher visibility in this area raises an important
question: does FDA’s posture or its recent related rulemaking activity preempt state-law causes of action
based on DTC advertising? The lower courts have begun to rule on this question and have reached mixed
results, although most cases hold that federal law administered by the FDA does not preempt state law
1Carol Rados, Truth in Advertising: Rx Drug Ads Come of Age, FDA Consumer Magazine at 1 (July-Aug. 2004).
2The transcripts of the FDA’s November 1 – 2, 2005, public meeting addressing the issue of DTC ad-
vertising contain an exhaustive amount of scrutiny of the practice. The transcripts from the Novem-
ber 1 and November 2 sessions are available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ddmac/dtc2005/transcript1.pdf and
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ddmac/dtc2005/051102Transcript.pdf, respectively.
3causes of action. This paper argues that federal law should be interpreted to preempt most state law causes
of action related to DTC advertising.
2.
The History and Regulation of DTC Advertising
a.
The Origins and Development of DTC Advertisements
DTC advertising of prescription drugs has its roots in the patient package insert (PPI) for prescription drugs,
which ﬁrst appeared in 1968.3 The purpose of the ﬁrst PPI was to inform consumers about how to use the
drug, but PPIs soon incorporated safety and eﬃcacy information.4 Although the FDA originally mandated
PPIs, this practice eventually met with resistance, and the FDA eventually transitioned to “a plan under
which pharmaceutical companies would voluntarily make more information about their products available
to consumers.”5 However, up until the late 1970s and early 1980s, drug companies were almost uniformly
reluctant to advertise directly to consumers for fear of making doctors feel as though they were being left
out of the treatment process.6
In the early 1980s, the tide turned and two manufacturers began using DTC advertising; this prompted FDA
commissioner Arthur Hull Hayes, Jr., to address the topic at a speech before a drug industry organization.7
Hayes predicted “exponential growth” in DTC advertising; this was not intended as a show of FDA support,
3See Wayne L. Pines, A History and Perspective on Direct-to-Consumer Promotion, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 489, 489 – 90
(1999). For a brief history of DTC advertising, see Daniel Richardson, The Lost Child of Products Liability: New Thoughts
About Advertising and the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 27 Vt. L. Rev. 1017, 1032 – 35 (2003).
4See Pines, supra note 3, at 490.
5See id.
6See id. at 491.
7See id. at 491 – 92.
4but the industry interpreted it as such.8 In September 1982, the FDA called for a voluntary moratorium
on DTC advertising, pending further study of its impact. In a notice published on September 9, 1985,
the FDA ﬁnally ruled “that it had jurisdiction over DTC advertisements, and that all such advertisements
must meet the same legal criteria as those directed at physicians.”9 According to Pines, this action was not
intended as a full-scale foray into the regulation of DTC advertising—it was merely intended to establish
FDA’s jurisdiction to regulate DTC advertising under “the existing rules and regulations that governed
physician-directed advertising.”10 With the moratorium lifted, DTC advertising has escalated steadily to its
present-day totals.11
b.
The Regulation of DTC Advertising
Prescription drug advertisements were originally regulated by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).12 The
1938 Wheeler-Lea Act “expanded the FTC’s jurisdiction from policing ‘unfair methods of competition’ to
include ‘unfair and deceptive acts or practices,”’ which gave the FTC the power to protect consumers.13 Many
states also enacted “little FTC Acts” to protect consumers against unfair trade practices.14 The Wheeler-
Lea Act also gave the FTC jurisdiction over the advertising of prescription drugs.15 In 1971, pursuant to
a Memorandum of Understanding between the two agencies, FTC transferred to FDA its responsibility for
policing prescription drug advertising.16
8See id. at 492.
9See id. at 493.
10See id.
11See id.
12See John Shaeﬀer, Prescription Drug Advertising—Should States Regulate What is False and Misleading?, 58 Food &
Drug L.J. 629, 630 (2003).
13See id.
14See id.
15See id.
16See id. at 631 – 32.
5As mentioned above, in 1985, FDA formally asserted jurisdiction over DTC advertising and ruled “that all
such advertisements must meet the same legal criteria as those directed at physicians.”17 FDA revisited the
issue in 1995, when it held a public meeting “to help it evaluate what was happening in the marketplace
and what further regulatory steps were needed.”18 After the 1997 departure of FDA Commissioner David
A. Kessler—who one commentator characterizes as opposed to prescription drug advertising—FDA allowed
drug companies to market speciﬁc products on television pursuant to a draft guidance statement.19 The ﬁnal
guidance document, published in August 1999, sets forth methods of fulﬁlling the requirement that ﬁrms
using broadcast advertising make “adequate provision ...for dissemination of the approved or permitted
package labeling in connection with the broadcast presentation.”20 Though the major focus of the guidance
document was the “adequate provision” requirement, the document also indicates the other characteristics
of permissible DTC advertising.21 Permissible DTC advertisements: (1) “[a]re not false or misleading in
any respect,” (2) “[p]resent a fair balance of information about eﬀectiveness and information about risk,”
(3) “[i]nclude a thorough major statement conveying all of the product’s most important risk information
in consumer-friendly language,” and (4) “[c]ommunicate all information relevant to the product’s indication
(including limitations to use) in consumer-friendly language.”22
The FDA’s program for evaluating DTC advertisements of prescription drugs conspicuously lacks any pre-
clearance mechanism.23 Companies can request FDA review of their draft advertisements, but this is not
mandatory.24 Though pre-clearance of advertisements is generally not mandatory, Congress has attempted
17See Pines, supra note 3, at 493.
18See id. at 496.
19See id. This draft guidance document ultimately became U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Guidance For Industry:
Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements (1999), http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/1804fnl.pdf (last visited Jan.
24, 2006).
20U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Guidance for Industry: Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements 1
(1999), http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/1804fnl.pdf.
21See id. at 2.
22Id.
23See, e.g., Erin Lenhardt, Why So Glum? Toward a Fair Balance of Competitive Interests in Direct-To-Consumer Adver-
tising and the Well-Being of the Mentally Ill Consumers It Targets, 15 Health Matrix 165, 167 (2005).
24See, e.g., id. at 167; Shaeﬀer, supra note 12, at 632 & n.20 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 352(n)(3)(a)) (suggesting that the lack
of a pre-clearance mechanism reﬂects congressional concern with running afoul of the First Amendment). FDA only requires
6“motivate drug companies to submit all proposed advertisements to the [FDA] before release to the general
public.”25 To this eﬀect, FDA enacted a “safe harbor” procedure whereby prescription drug advertisements
which are submitted to FDA prior to their release, and which are deemed to comply with FDA regula-
tions, will not be subject to later action without notice to the advertiser and a reasonable opportunity for
correction.26
Ten years after the 1995 meeting that resulted in the aforementioned guidance document, the FDA revisited
the issue. On November 1 – 2, 2005, the FDA held a hearing to receive public comment on DTC advertising.27
The agency received comments from a broad range of sources, from individual consumers to drug industry
trade groups, and expressing a broad range of feelings about the desirability of DTC advertising, from some
who condemn it to others who defend it as a constitutional right.28 This paper will not discuss the views of
all those who submitted comments but will proceed to the fundamental question raised by the FDA’s recent
involvement in the policy space of DTC advertising: to what extent, if any, does FDA’s involvement in this
area preempt state regulation (either legislative or through the working of state tort law)?
pre-clearance of promotional materials if the prescription drug was approved on an accelerated basis. See, e.g., Francis B.
Palumbo & C. Daniel Mullins, The Development of Direct-To-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising Regulation, 57 Food
& Drug L.J. 423, 429 (2002).
25See Shaeﬀer, supra note 12, at 632.
26See id. at 633. This “safe harbor” was enacted at the behest of Congress. See id. at 632 & n.21.
27See supra note 2 for the location of the transcripts of the meeting.
28The views of commentators who did not participate in the meeting are also divided. Many have called for stricter regulation
of DTC advertisements. See, e.g., Lenhardt, supra note 23, at 168 (calling for FDA pre-clearance of DTC advertisements);
Palumbo & Mullins, supra note 24, at 434 – 46 (describing proposed legislation aimed at DTC advertising); id. at 438 –
39 (describing some doctors’ resistance to DTC advertising). Substantially fewer commentators have called for less-stringent
regulation of DTC advertising. One such criticism comes from Evans and Friede, who lament that “requiring manufacturers to
include an exhaustive list of a product’s risks as well as its beneﬁts, not only dilutes the force and increases the cost of truthful,
promotional messages that manufacturers wish to carry but also hampers drug manufacturers’ ability to respond truthfully
to attacks on their products.” See George W. Evans & Arnold I. Friede, The Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation
of Prescription Drug Manufacturer Speech: A First Amendment Analysis, 58 Food & Drug L.J. 365, 410 (2003). Evans
and Friede also question the permissibility under the First Amendment of regulating DTC advertisements, see id. at 416,
and criticize the FDA’s requirement of contemporaneous submission of DTC advertisements because although compliance is
technically voluntary, “it functions in practice as a mandatory requirement.” See id. at 424 & n.373 (arguing that the FDA
recognzes that the voluntary DTC submission policy is “perceived [as a] requirement for manufacturers to obtain prior clearance
from the agency for all prescription drug and biological DTC promotion”).
73.
Preemption
Preemption doctrine comprises four analytical categories.29 The ﬁrst is express preemption, in which
Congress writes preemptory language in the text of the statute.30 Then, there are three types of im-
plied preemption. The ﬁrst type of implied preemption is “ﬁeld preemption,” where the federal regulation
“occupie[s] the entire ﬁeld, leaving no scope of this topical issue for states to regulate.”31 Second is “conﬂict
preemption,” where “a federal agency such as FDA may ﬁnd a conﬂict between the state activity and the
federal agency programs.”32 In the ﬁnal category of implied preemption, “the overlap between federal and
state norms may be troublesome, and a court may preempt because the state norms act as obstacles to
completion of the federal program.”33
In this Section, I will review the positions taken by the major players in the preemption debate—Congress,
the Supreme Court, and the FDA—in areas under the purview of the FDA. Where these positions do not
explicitly relate to DTC advertising of prescription drugs, I will oﬀer my own analysis on how best to do
so. The next Section will review how these positions are reﬂected in recent lower-court decisions on whether
preemption applies in cases involving DTC advertising of prescription drugs.
a.
Congress’ insights on preemption in areas under FDA purview.
29See James T. O’Reilly, A State of Extinction: Does Food and Drug Administration of a Prescription Drug Label Extinguish
State Claims for Inadequate Warning?, 58 Food & Drug L.J. 287, 289 (2003).
30See id.
31See id.
32See id.
33See id.
8Congress has not explicitly addressed the issue of preemption in the prescription drug context, let alone in
the context of DTC advertising thereof. However, Congress has explicitly addressed preemption in several
other areas under the FDA’s purview. Congress ﬁrst addressed the relative powers of the FDA and the
states in the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 1966,34 which “speciﬁcally provided that States could
not enforce diﬀerent or less stringent laws with respect to disclosures of quantity on the label of any food,
drugs, or cosmetic.”35 Next, in 1976, Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the
FDCA, which contained a preemption provision that did not preempt state laws outright, but “precluded
States from enforcing any requirements ‘which were diﬀerent from, or in addition to, any requirement’ of
the MDA.”36 Because this language diﬀers from that found in statutes where Congress preempted all state
regulation in a given area, the Supreme Court in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr concluded that Congress did not
intend to preclude all state tort law in the areas covered by the MDA.37 Finally, when Congress enacted
the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1998 (FDAMA), it included language intended
to harmonize state and federal law related to OTC drug labeling and packaging.38 However, FDAMA also
“expressed a clear intent that this harmonization language not preempt state product liability claims or
false advertising claims unrelated to product safety.”39 FDAMA does not mention harmonization related to
prescription drugs, which supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend to expressly preempt state
laws regulating prescription drug packaging, labeling, and advertising.40
With these examples of explicit congressional preemption in mind, what principle can be discerned? As
mentioned above, the FDCA does not contain any express preemption language applicable to prescription
34Pub. L. No. 89-755, 80 Stat. 1296 (1966) (codiﬁed at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451 et seq.).
35See Shaeﬀer, supra note 12, at 634 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1461).
36See id. at 634 & n.43 – 44 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)).
37See id. at 634 – 35 & n.46.
38See id. at 635.
39See id. at 636.
40See id.
9drugs.41 This would seem to undermine the argument for preemption by the FDCA in the prescription drug
context.42 Congress knows how to preempt state law when it wants to do so—or so the argument goes.
On the other hand, there are underlying reasons why Congress’ non-preemption in other areas might support
preemption in the prescription drug context. For instance, in the medical device context, there are reasons
to doubt the comprehensiveness of the FDA’s review process, making state law a beneﬁcial supplement to
FDA enforcement. As Hall points out, most medical devices reach market without FDA reviewing their
safety (because they are claimed by the manufacturer to be substantially equivalent to a device already on
the market).43 Conversely, FDA reviews the safety and eﬃcacy of all new prescription drugs—thus, it may
seem more “reasonable to substitute the FDA scrutiny for state tort law regulation with respect to the drug’s
safety.”44
However, it would be problematic to simply conclude, based on this consideration, that preemption should
apply. The FDA’s review of DTC advertising is not nearly as rigorous as its review of prescription drug
safety and eﬃcacy. In fact, most prescription drug advertisements reach the market the same way most
medical devices do—without pre-clearance. Moreover, while many claims based on DTC advertising may
be inextricably linked to a drug’s safety and eﬃcacy (e.g., failure-to-warn and fraud claims), there may be
claims where the connection is more tenuous.45 Based on the above, it is this author’s opinion that a clear
congressional stance on preemption of DTC advertising cannot be discerned. Of course, this does not rule
out the possibility of implied preemption.46
41See, e.g., Timothy S. Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermediary Rule for the New Pharmaceutical Marketplace, 35 Seton
Hall L. Rev. 193, 256 (2004).
42See id. at 256 – 57.
43See id. at 257.
44See id.
45For example, consider that one of the major objections to DTC advertising is not that it puts consumers in danger, but
simply that it stimulates unnecessary demand for prescription drugs, particularly high-cost, brand-name drugs. See, e.g., Pines,
supra note 3, at 511. This is a broader policy consideration that, at ﬁrst blush, does not appear squarely within the FDA’s
safety-and-eﬃcacy review. On the other hand, the FDA has asserted that it believes drugs have an optimal level of use. See
infra note 80 and accompanying text. If this is indeed true, then the FDA’s position toward a given drug may be inﬂuenced by
what the agency considers to be the “optimal” demand for the drug.
46Cf. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 869, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 1919, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000) (holding that,
where an express preemption clause exists but does not cover state tort law, implied preemption still must be considered).
10b.
The Supreme Court’s insights on preemption in areas under FDA purview.
The Supreme Court’s precedent on federal preemption in the areas of food and drug law also provides
some insight on the preemption question in the DTC advertising context. The most important Supreme
Court precedents on the question of whether the statutes administered by the FDA preempt state law are
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr 47 and Buckman Co. v. Plaintiﬀs’ Legal Committee.48
In Medtronic, the Court considered whether the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 preempted a common-
law negligence action by a woman who was injured when her pacemaker failed.49 The case addressed federal
preemption under the MDA, not the FDCA,50 so this summary will address only the considerations that
would aﬀect federal preemption of state laws related to prescription drugs.
The Court reasoned that its resolution of the preemption issue started with the text of the preemption
provision but was “informed by two presumptions about the nature of pre-emption.”51 The ﬁrst presumption
is that “Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action,” particularly in the areas of
health and safety, given “the historic primacy of state regulation” in these areas.52 Second, the purpose of
Congress—as discerned from the text of the statute, the statutory framework, the structure and purpose of
the statute as a whole, and the intended eﬀects of the statute on “business, consumers, and the law”—should
guide the preemption inquiry.53
47518 U.S. 470, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996).
48531 U.S. 341, 121 S.Ct. 1012, 148 L.Ed.2d 854 (2001).
49See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 474.
50See id.
51See id. at 484 – 85.
52See id. at 485. Coronato and Lanza date this presumption to Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S.
707, 715, 718 (1985). See Wilfred P. Coronato & Stephen Lanza, The Fracture That Will Not Heal: The Landscape of Federal
Preemption in the Fields of Medical Devices, Prescription and Over-The-Counter Drugs Ten Years After Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, ALI-ABA Course of Study, Products Liability: Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Issues 365, 369 & n.19
(2005).
53See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 – 86.
11The Court oﬀered a number of indications of a congressional purpose not to preempt state law. First, the
Court called it “implausible” that Congress intended to “bar[] most, if not all, relief for persons injured
by defective medical devices” (because no private right of action was explicit or implied).54 The Court
found broad preemption implausible because the purpose of the MDA was to regulate more stringently an
industry previously deﬁcient in protecting health and safety.55 Moreover, the Court found no indication
in the legislative history that the MDA was intended to broadly preempt common-law actions; it found
this absence signiﬁcant, “particularly since Members of both Houses were acutely aware of ongoing product
liability litigation.”56 Finally, the Court opined that it could be sure it was eﬀectuating Congress’ purpose by
comparing the speciﬁcity of the relevant federal regulation to the speciﬁcity of the allegedly inconsistent state-
law requirement.57 Thus, speciﬁc state-law requirements that conﬂict with speciﬁc federal requirements are
likely to be pre-empted.58 On the other hand, “general obligations” under state law (such as a manufacturer’s
general duty “to use due care to avoid foreseeable dangers in its products”) are unlikely to interfere with
“generic concerns” expressed by the federal government in a given area.59
Although it does not fall neatly into either of the two “presumptions” supposedly guiding the Court’s analysis,
the Court also opined that its analysis was “substantially informed” by FDA regulations interpreting the
scope of the preemption provision.60
In Buckman Co. v. Plaintiﬀs’ Legal Committee, the Supreme Court revisited the question of when statutes
54See id. at 487.
55See id. at 487.
56See id. at 491.
57See id. at 500 – 501.
58See id. at 501.
59The Court contrasted these “generic concerns” with laws or regulations where the federal government “weighed the compet-
ing interests relevant to the particular requirement in question, reached an unambiguous conclusion about how those competing
considerations should be resolved in a particular case or set of cases, and implemented that conclusion via a speciﬁc mandate.”
See id. at 501.
60See id. at 495.
12administered by the FDA should preempt state law.61 The case involved state-law causes of action asserting
that a medical device manufacturer “made fraudulent representations to the FDA as to the intended use of the
[devices] and that, as a result, the devices were improperly given market clearance and were subsequently used
to the plaintiﬀs’ detriment.”62 The Court began its analysis by noting that “[p]olicing fraud against federal
agencies is hardly ‘a ﬁeld which the States have traditionally occupied,’ such as to warrant a presumption
against ﬁnding federal pre-emption of a state-law cause of action.”63 The Court held that preemption applied
so as not to upset the “balance of statutory objectives.”64 The Court described the § 510(k) premarket
notiﬁcation scheme for medical devices substantially equivalent to a predicate device as “comprehensive,”
even though it lacks the “rigor” of premarket approval, because it imposes “a variety of requirements”
with “various provisions aimed at detecting, deterring, and punishing false statements made during this
and related approval processes.”65 The Court was concerned that facing ﬁfty states’ tort regimes would
unduly burden those going through the FDA premarket notiﬁcation process and opined that “[s]tate-law
fraud-on-the-FDA claims inevitably conﬂict with the FDA’s responsibility to police fraud consistent with
the Administration’s judgment and objectives.”66 Importantly, the Court held that preemption applied even
though “Congress included an express preemption provision in the MDA.”67 Referring to its opinion in Geier
v. American Honda Motor Co., the Court reiterated that “neither an express pre-emption provision nor a
savings clause “bar[s] the ordinary working of conﬂict pre-emption principles.”68
What general principle can be discerned from these two recent Supreme Court cases on preemption under
the MDA? Perhaps none. Some commentators believed that Buckman “would herald the expansion of the
61See 531 U.S. 341, 343, 121 S.Ct. 1012, 148 L.Ed.2d 854 (2001).
62See id. at 347.
63Id. at 347 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed.
1447 (1947)).
64See id. at 348.
65See id. at 348 – 49.
66See id. at 350.
67See id. at 352.
68See id. (citing Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 120 S.Ct. 1913, 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000)).
13implied preemption doctrine.”69 However, this has not proven to be true. The lack of guiding principles is
perhaps reﬂected in the diversity of holdings in the lower courts, with some courts ﬁnding preemption while
others essentially limit Buckman to its facts.70 As a result, some have characterized the Supreme Court’s
pronouncements on preemption in this area as confusing.71 The caselaw seems to reﬂect a patchwork of
considerations rather than a guiding principle, even if congressional intent is ostensibly guiding the inquiry.
c.
The FDA’s stance on preemption
Of the three actors considered in this Section, the FDA currently has the clearest stance on preemption in
the prescription-drug area. Before 2002, FDA “remained aloof from preemption arguments that often had
been made by prescription drug manufacturers.”72 In recent years, however, FDA has started openly to
espouse the view that the FDCA preempts state law in the area of prescription drug regulation. Some have
argued that the George W. Bush administration is pushing for preemption of state tort-law suits related to
prescription drugs and medical devices.73 Whatever the impetus, the FDA’s preemption stance has been
69See Coronato & Lanza, supra note 52, at 380 (citing W. Kennedy Simpson, Recent Developments in Products, General
Liability, and Consumer Law, 37 Tort & Ins. L.J. 621, 644 (2002)).
70For example, these courts have held that, while Buckman preempts “fraud on the FDA” claims, it does not extend to
claims of fraud on the general public, physicians, corporate healthcare providers, or others. See James M. Beck et al., Recent
Developments in Products, General Liability, and Consumer Law, 39 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 629, 640 & n.104 (2004)
(citing Gilleon v. Medtronic USA, Inc., Nos. C01-20460 RMW, C01- 20497 RMW, C01-20693 RMW, 2002 WL 31300694, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2002); Woods v. Gliatech, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809-10 (W.D. Va. 2002); Bryant v. Hoﬀmann-
LaRoche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 725 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)); see also William A. Dreier, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising Liability
Revisited, ALI-ABA Course of Study, Products Liability: Pharmaceutical and Medical Device Issues 25 (2005) (The
version of this source available on the WestLaw database is, unfortunately, not paginated.). Dreier qualiﬁes that the claim must
not be “transparently an allegation of fraud on the FDA.” See id. (citing Bouchard v. Am. Home Prods., 213 F.Supp.2d 802
(N.D. Ohio 2002)).
71See Coronato & Lanza, supra note 52, at 380.
72See O’Reilly, supra note 29, at 288 & n.12 (citing MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 139, 475 N.E.2d
65, 70 (1985)). But cf. Reni Gertner, FDA Drug Rule Asserts Federal Preemption: Plaintiﬀs’ Lawyers Prepare for Battle,
Lawyers Weekly USA, February 13, 2006, at 23 (stating that the January 24, 2006, prescription drug labeling rule itself
“states that the agency has made similar preemption statements in rules since 1982, including those related to aspirin labeling,
over-the-counter drug packaging and drug warnings about pregnancy and nursing”).
73See Hall, supra note 41, at 259 & n.325 (citing Robert Pear, In a Shift, Bush Moves to Block Medical Suits, N.Y. Times,
July 25, 2004, at 1); see also Gertner, supra note 72, at 23.
14seen in two areas: (1) in amicus curae briefs in cases where drug manufacturers assert preemption arguments
and (2) in regulations.
The ﬁrst case where FDA submitted an amicus curae brief in support of preemption in the prescription drug
area was in Motus v. Pﬁzer Inc..74 In Motus, the wife of a man who committed suicide while taking Pﬁzer’s
prescription drug Zoloft sued for failure to warn her husband of the drug’s side eﬀects.75 Pﬁzer defended that
conﬂict preemption doctrine barred the claim because the FDA had “already considered and rejected the
inclusion of such a warning in Zoloft’s labeling.”76 The district court rejected the preemption defense.77 On
appeal, the FDA’s amicus brief presented two reasons why preemption should apply. First, the FDA argued
that preemption should apply when a manufacturer is faced with a choice “either to avoid tort liability or
comply with the FDCA.”78 This would be the case, argued the FDA, if a state were to require a warning that
had been considered and rejected by the agency.79 Second, the FDA argued that preemption should apply
to avoid “obstruct[ing] the purposes and objectives of federal law” by altering the balance struck by FDA
regarding the “optimal use” of the drug; the additional warning that would have been required to comply
with state tort law would have over-deterred use of the drug by imposing an artiﬁcially strong warning.80
The FDA has also openly espoused the position that the FDA preempts state law causes of action in recent
74See O’Reilly, supra note 29, at 288 & n.11 – 12; Amicus Brief for United States in Support of the Defendant-Appellee and
Cross-Appellant, Motus v. Pﬁzer Inc., (2002) Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498, 2002 WL 32303084. It appears that the Ninth Circuit
did not accept the preemption argument because the case was eventually decided on the merits. See Motus v. Pﬁzer Inc., 196
F.Supp.2d 984 (C.D. Cal. 2001), aﬀ’d sub nom. Motus v. Pﬁzer Inc. (Roerig Div.), 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004). The FDA
also supported preemption on behalf of a drug manufacturer in In re Paxil Litig., No. CV 01-07937 MRP, 2002 WL 31375497
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2002). See infra notes 127 – 130 and accompanying text.
75See Motus, 127 F.Supp.2d at 1086 – 87.
76See id. at 1087.
77See id. at 1096 (no conﬂict preemption), 1099 (no frustration of congressional purpose).
78Amicus Brief for United States in Support of the Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, Motus v. Pﬁzer Inc., 2002 WL
at *12.
79See id. at *12 – *13.
80See id. at *14 – *15; see also id. at *23 (“Under-utilization of a drug based on dissemination of scientiﬁcally unsubstantiated
warnings, so as to deprive patients of beneﬁcial, possibly lifesaving treatment, could well frustrate the purposes of federal
regulation as much as over-utilization resulting from a failure to disclose a drug’s scientiﬁcally demonstrable adverse eﬀects.”).
15regulations. On January 18, 2006, the agency announced a ﬁnal rule regarding the format of the physician
package insert for prescription drugs.81 The new rule introduces new Highlights and Table of Contents
sections aimed at improving consumer understanding of drug beneﬁts and risks.82
The new format appears to give the manufacturer some discretion in the presentation of risk-and-beneﬁt
information; this aspect had troubled many of the parties who submitted comments on the proposed rule
because of its implications for product liability litigation. Thus, some comments on the proposed rule
expressed concern that manufacturers who highlighted some information to the exclusion of other information
would be “more vulnerable to product liability claims.”83 In a similar vein, other comments “requested that
the agency state in the ﬁnal rule that FDA approval of labeling, whether it be in the old or new format,
preempts conﬂicting or contrary State law, regulations, or decisions of a court of law for purposes of product
liability litigation.”84 The FDA responded that it “believes that under existing preemption principles,
FDA approval of labeling under the act, whether it be in the old or new format, preempts conﬂicting or
contrary State law.”85 The agency elaborated that it considers this “the government’s long standing views
on preemption.”86
Further elaborating its stance on preemption, the agency criticized some state courts for holding “that FDA
labeling requirements represent a minimum safety standard” above which states are free to require additional
information.87 The FDA corrected that it “interprets the act to establish both a ‘ﬂoor’ and a ‘ceiling’. . . .”
81See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Announces New Prescription Drug Information Format to Im-
prove Patient Safety, http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2005/NEW01272.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2006). The new
rule was published in the Federal Register on January 24, 2006. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for
Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922-01 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201,
314, 601).
82See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, supra note 81.
83See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg.
3922-01, 3933 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601).
84See id. at 3933 – 34
85See id. at 3934.
86See id. But see supra note 72.
87See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg.
3922-01, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601).
16because “additional disclosures of risk information” could render labeling false and misleading as well.88 The
agency believes that “[o]verwarning, just like underwarning, can similarly have a negative eﬀect on patient
safety and public health.”89 The agency also noted the litigation briefs submitted by the Justice Department
supporting implied federal preemption of state law causes of action in areas within the purview of FDA.90
The agency then set forth a non-exhaustive list of the claims it believed would be preempted.91 Most relevant
to the current discussion on DTC advertising are
claims that a drug sponsor breached an obligation to warn by failing to include in an advertisement
any information the substance of which appears anywhere in the labeling, in those cases where
a drug’s sponsor has used Highlights consistently with FDA draft guidance regarding the ‘brief
summary’ in direct-to-consumer advertising. . . claims that a drug sponsor breached an obligation
to warn by failing to include a statement in labeling or in advertising, the substance of which had
been proposed to FDA for inclusion in labeling, if that statement was not required by FDA at the
time plaintiﬀ claims the sponsor had an obligation to warn (unless FDA has made a ﬁnding that the
sponsor withheld material information relating to the proposed warning before plaintiﬀ claims the
sponsor had the obligation to warn). . . [and] claims that a drug sponsor breached an obligation to
warn by failing to include in labeling or in advertising a statement the substance of which FDA has
prohibited in labeling or advertising.92
To some, this represents a stronger stance than ever before; it may be telling that this rule immediately
attracted the attention of the mainstream press.93 Moreover, former FDA attorneys have expressed a belief
that this stance would “provide broader protections to drug makers.”94
The importance of the FDA’s stance is a nuanced issue. On the one hand, the Supreme Court’s decision in
88See id. at 3935.
89Id. at 3935.
90See id. at 3934, 3935 & n.8. The agency points out that the lack of an express preemption provision “does not bar the
operation of ordinary principles of implied preemption.” Id. at 3935 n.8 (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529
U.S. 861, 869 (2000)).
91See id. at 3935 – 36.
93Both the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal carried articles mentioning the preemption language soon after
announcement of the ﬁnal rule. See Gardiner Harris, New Drug Label Rule Is Intended to Reduce Medical Errors, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 19, 2006, at A14; Heather Won Tesoriero & Anna Wilde Mathews, Decision on Pre-Emption May Change Plaintiﬀ
Lawyers’ Tactics, Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 2006, at D3.
94See Harris, supra note 93, at A14. Providing broader protection to drug makers is presumably why “[t]rial lawyers reacted
angrily” to the preemption language as well. See id.
17Medtronic seem to give deference to the agency’s stance on preemption.95 On the other hand, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine declines to give deference to the agency’s well-considered
stance on preemption in situations where the agency has declined to regulate. Speciﬁcally, in Sprietsma,
the Court held that “the Coast Guard’s decision not to adopt a regulation requiring propeller guards on
motorboats” did not preempt, either expressly or impliedly, state-law claims based on the manufacturer’s
failure to provide a propeller guard.96 Sprietsma has led one commentator to conclude that, from now
on, “there will be little if any implied preemption in situations where a regulatory agency has made a
decision not to regulate, even if that decision was deliberate and was the product of intense prior study.”97
Another commentator agrees: “When an agency with power to make rules does much less—[such as] simply
submitting one appellate amicus brief [in support of preemption]—it has eschewed the platform from which
deference can be asserted, and from which past FDA actions have won deference.”98 However, if it chose
to do more than merely submitting amicus curiae briefs, the FDA would risk running afoul of the First
Amendment by unduly insinuating itself into DTC advertising. It is uncontroversial that FDA regulation or
restriction of DTC prescription-drug advertising would be subject to First Amendment scrutiny.99 Moreover,
Congress has expressed concern about allowing restriction of DTC and thus rejected pre-clearance.100 Thus,
95See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2255, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (“The FDA regulations
interpreting the scope of [21 U.S.C.] § 360k’s pre-emptive eﬀect support the Lohrs’ view, and our interpretation of the pre-
emption statute is substantially informed by those regulations.”); see also Coronato & Lanza, supra note 52, at 384 – 85 &
n.184 (citing Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 722); cf. also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883, 120 S.Ct.
1913, 1926 (giving “some weight” to the Department of Transportation’s conclusion that conﬂict preemption should apply in
the context of a statute implemented and administered by the agency).
96See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 55 – 56, 123 S.Ct. 518, 527 – 28 (2002), cited in Beck et al., supra note
70, at 639.
97See Beck et al., supra note 70, at 640.
98O’Reilly, supra note 29, at 290 – 91 (internal citations omitted).
99See, e,g., Evans & Friede, supra note 28, at 366; cf. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 122 S.Ct. 1497, 152
L.Ed.2d 563 (2002) (holding that truthful advertising of compounded drugs constitutes protected “commercial speech” under
the First Amendment).
100See supra note 24 and sources cited therein. The policy of allowing manufacturers a voice in the debate seems sound
because the speech of the other actors in the prescription drug market—even interested actors—is unregulated by the FDA. See
Evans & Friede, supra note 28, at 427 (“[M]any unregulated messages reach the intended audience for DTC advertisements.”).
As Evans and Friede point out, “Health Maintenance Organizations, Pharmacy Beneﬁts Managers and even state Medicaid
administrators pursue their own economic interests in aﬀecting prescribing behavior. . . . Even the government has added its
voice to the public health debate, launching a year-long DTC advertising campaign extolling the virtues of generic drugs.” See
id. at 368.
18one must recognize that any action taken by FDA will be taken in the shadow of invalidation under the
First Amendment. For this reason, the FDA should be able to “win deference” in the eyes of the Court,
without formally regulating the activity where it believes preemption applies (as was required by the Court
in Sprietsma).101
4.
The Lower Courts’ Treatment of Preemption in the Prescription Drug and DTC Advertising
Context Since Medtronic and Buckman.
I will now examine cases that have addressed the question of whether preemption applies to certain claims
based on DTC advertising. The lower courts have addressed (or inevitably will address) preemption in three
distinct types of claims.
a.
Failure to Warn Claim Not Preempted: Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc.
In Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc., the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed plaintiﬀs’ claims that
Wyeth had engaged in a “massive advertising campaign” for the contraceptive Norplant, “which it directed
at women rather than at their doctors.”102 According to the plaintiﬀs, this advertising failed to adequately
warn them of Norplant’s dangers.103 The Supreme Court of New Jersey crafted an exception to the “learned
intermediary doctrine”—which would normally insulate the manufacturer from liability where the prescribing
physician was adequately warned of the dangers of the drug—in instances where the manufacturer marketed
101See Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 55 – 56.
102161 N.J. 1, 6, 734 A.2d 1245, 1248 (1999).
103See id.
19directly to consumers.104 Although the Court seemed to intimate that federal preemption might apply in
this area,105 it concluded that plaintiﬀs should be permitted to rebut the presumption that manufacturers
complying with federal law have satisﬁed whatever duty to warn may arise from the fact that they advertise
directly to consumers.106 In sum, under Perez, failure-to-warn claims based on DTC advertising are not
barred by federal preemption. Despite the potential signiﬁcance of this holding, one commentator has noted
that “[s]tate courts have by and large ignored DTC advertising and its eﬀects when deciding cases involving
the [learned intermediary doctrine].”107 Nonetheless, it is important to consider claims of this type for two
reasons.
First, failure-to-warn cases based on prescription drug labeling are relatively common.108 Since labeling and
advertising are close cousins (in terms of containing statements or omissions that could generate litigation),
one might reasonably expect an increase in failure-to-warn claim based on DTC advertising. Second, failure-
to-warn claims based on DTC advertising are speciﬁcally targeted by the FDA’s recent rulemaking; the
ﬁnal rule asserts preemption of failure-to-warn cases beyond the labeling context and into the advertising
context.109
Although failure-to-warn claims based on DTC advertising might seem like a brier patch for plaintiﬀs because
of the FDA’s recent rulemaking, it may not be extraordinary to encounter such claims in the near future.
First, the courts have not yet decided whether the FDA’s assertion of preemption in its recent rulemaking
104See id. at 21.
105See id. at 21 – 22 (“In reaching the conclusion that the learned intermediary doctrine does not apply to the direct marketing
of drugs to consumers, we must necessarily consider that when prescription drugs are marketed and labeled in accordance with
FDA speciﬁcations, the pharmaceutical manufacturers should not have to confront ‘state tort liability premised on theories
of design defect or warning inadequacy.”’ (quoting Note, A Question of Competence: The Judicial Role in the Regulation of
Pharmaceuticals, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 773, 773 (1990))).
106See id. at 24.
107See Daniel Richardson, The Lost Child of Products Liability: New Thoughts About Advertising and the Learned Interme-
diary Doctrine, 27 Vt. L. Rev. 1017, 1020 (1999).
108See, e.g., Motus v. Pﬁzer Inc., 127 F.Supp.2d 1085 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
109See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg.
3922-01, 3935 – 36 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601).
20is legally valid.110 Although valid federal regulations are entitled to preemptive eﬀect,111 some have argued
that, because of its placement in the preamble to the rule, the preemption language means that it “has no
force [or] eﬀect of law.”112 Second, plaintiﬀs in some jurisdictions may be forced to channel their claims into
the DTC advertising arena to avoid more-settled preemption in other areas—for example, in jurisdictions that
have found consumer fraud claims preempted.113 Such a shift seems eminently plausible since prescription
drug litigation has already witnessed one wave of claim transmogriﬁcation in order to avoid preemption:
Drier writes that “[i]nstead of (or in addition to) asserting defect or warranty claims,” plaintiﬀs now place
the claims within a traditionally state-based area,”114 such as under state consumer fraud laws, to avoid
preemption.115 Thus, plaintiﬀs may shift their claims into the failure-to-warn rubric if other claims have
already been deemed preempted in that jurisdiction.
b.
Fraud and False Advertising Claims
Claims for fraud and/or false advertising have been the most frequently litigated of those claims that could
involve DTC advertising of prescription drugs. The lower courts are split on whether federal preemption
applies to state-law fraud and false advertising claims.
i.
110See Gertner, supra note 72, at 23; Tesoriero & Mathews, supra note 93, at D3.
111See, e.g., Shaeﬀer, supra note 12, at 637 & n.66 (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
153 (1982)).
112See Gertner, supra note 72, at 1, 23. But see id. at 1 (quoting Daniel Troy, former chief counsel of the FDA, for the
proposition that, “[i]f any court applies sound administrative law principles, it should ﬁnd [that the FDA’s position embodied
in the rule] is entitled to deference”).
113See infra notes 123 – 126 and accompanying text.
114See Dreier, supra note 70.
115See id.
21Preemption Does Not Apply: Solvay Pharmaceuticals
In Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Ethex Corp., both plaintiﬀ and defendant marketed “competing pre-
scription pancreatic enzyme supplements used in the treatment of cystic ﬁbrosis.”116 The plaintiﬀ alleged
that the defendant’s marketing of its product as “equivalent,” “comparable,” and “generic” compared to
the plaintiﬀ’s product violated Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, as well as the Minnesota Unfair Trade
Practices Act, the Minnesota Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the Minnesota False Advertising Act,
and the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act.117 To avoid the defendant’s contention that it was impermissibly
attempting to privately enforce the FDCA, the plaintiﬀ phrased its argument as simply that the defendant’s
comparisons were false in fact.118 The court held that, despite the “overlap”—and “potential conﬂict”—
between the Lanham Act and the FDCA, “the FDA’s enforcement of the FDCA is primarily concerned with
the safety and eﬃcacy of new drugs, while the Lanham Act is focused on the truth or falsity of advertising
claims.”119 Thus, “false statements are actionable under the Lanham Act, even if their truth may be gener-
ally within the purview of the FDA,”120 as long as the statements can be proven false without reference to
FDA standards.121 The court then extended its analysis on the Lanham Act claim to the state law claims
as well and held that preemption did not apply.122
ii.
116See No. Civ. 03-2836 JRTFLN, 2004 WL 742033, at *1 (D. Minn. March 30, 2004).
117See id.
118See id. at *1 – *2.
119See id. at *3.
120See id. (quoting Summit Technology, Inc. v. High-Line Medical Instruments, 933 F.Supp. 918, 933 (C.D. Cal. 1996)).
The limitation of the Lanham Act claim is that it may not be enforceable by consumers (or those acting on their behalf), but
only by competitors. See Lenhardt, supra note 23, at 170 – 71 & n.27.
121See Solvay Pharmaceuticals, 2004 WL at *3.
122See id. at *4.
22Preemption Applies: Pennsylvania Employee Beneﬁt Trust
Fund
In Pennsylvania Employee Beneﬁt Trust Fund v. Zeneca, Inc., the plaintiﬀ class sued the drug manufacturer
for falsely implying in advertising materials that its drug Nexium was superior to its other drug Prilosec
once the latter went generic.123 This behavior allegedly violated the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act, as
well as the consumer protection statutes of all other states.124 The court concluded that claims based on
statements consistent with FDA-approved labeling would be preempted by federal law because the FDA
approval “reﬂects a determination by the FDA that the information is not ‘false or misleading.”’125 The
court also concluded that preemption would apply even if a particular state consumer protection statute did
not have a provision exempting statements from liability if they complied with relevant FTC regulations.126
c.
Speciﬁc Relief Claim Not Preempted: In re Paxil Litigation
In In re Paxil Litigation, the plaintiﬀs sought to prevent Glaxo Smithkline Beecham from airing television
commercials claiming that its prescription drug, Paxil, is “not habit forming.”127 Both the FDA and Glaxo
Smithkline Beecham argued that preemption should apply to state common-law claims based on direct-to-
consumer advertising.128 The court remarked that that “the parties reveal no case holding that the FDCA
preempts state law either expressly or impliedly” and that preemption would “run contrary to the grain of
other decisions.”129 In the court’s view, it deﬁed common sense that Congress would simultaneously decline
123See No. Civ. 05-075-SLR, 2005 WL 2993937, at *1 (D. Del. Nov. 8, 2005).
124See id.
125See id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.125(b)(6)).
126See id. at *2 – *3.
127See No. CV 01-07937 MRP, 2002 WL 31375497 at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2002).
128See id.
129See id.
23to authorize a private cause of action and also preempt state common-law claims.130
5.
Analysis—When Should Preemption Apply?
As a preliminary matter, there are certain considerations that apply across-the-board to the analysis of the
preemption issue. First, one must recognize that prescription drug labeling and DTC advertising of pre-
scription drugs are closely linked. Much of the information that appears in (or is omitted from) prescription
drug labels is also used in (or omitted from) DTC advertisements of prescription drugs. Although the FDA’s
review of DTC advertisements is more sporadic, it is not necessarily less searching—DTC advertisements,
like prescription drug labels, must not be “false or misleading.” Moreover, there is no compelling reason why
plaintiﬀs should be able to maintain claims alleging the same acts or omissions under a “DTC advertising”
rubric that would more clearly be preempted if based on the drug’s labeling.
Second, “conﬂict” preemption should apply in a substantial number of concrete cases as a result of the
FDA’s “safe harbor” for DTC advertisements submitted for pre-release review.131 The case is strong for
preemption of state-law suits based on any DTC advertisement that had undergone such review. For states
to impose tort liability without giving the manufacturer a reasonable opportunity to correct any defects in
the advertisement would be plainly inconsistent with the “safe harbor” that Congress intended.132
This also hints at another reason for extending preemption to all actions based on DTC advertising: if
drug manufacturers knew that pre-release review would insulate them from state-law suits based on DTC
advertising, there would be a massive increase in the number of advertisements submitted for review. It is
130See id.
131See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
132See id.
24not clear that the FDA is staﬀed and funded at a level suﬃcient for it to pre-clear all DTC advertisements.
If resources were kept at current levels and a backlog in the pre-clearance process resulted, it would put
more pressure on the First Amendment concerns that argue against pre-clearance of DTC advertisement in
the ﬁrst place.133
With these two points in mind, I will consider whether there remains any appropriate place for state tort
law in the three types of actions discussed above.
a.
Failure-To-Warn Claims
State-law failure-to-warn claims based on DTC advertising should generally be preempted under implied
preemption doctrine as an “obstacle” to the FDA’s program of prescription drug labeling, which encompasses
the notion of optimal drug use.134 When the FDA approves prescription drug labeling, it does so only after
thorough, considered evaluation of the drug’s risks and beneﬁts.135 Failure-to-warn claims based on DTC
advertising may assert positions inconsistent with the FDA’s judgment as to a drug’s optimal use, accounting
for its risks and beneﬁts, as embodied in its labeling. To the extent that manufacturers make statements in
DTC advertising that are not essentially founded in their drugs’ labeling, there remains a place for failure-
to-warn claims. The FDA’s January 24, 2006, rulemaking recognizes this—it only asserts preemption as
to actions based on statements “the substance of which appears anywhere in the labeling.”136 Given the
133See supra note 24.
134See supra note 33.
135See, e.g., Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed.
Reg. 3922-01, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601) (“[T]he agency makes approval decisions
based not on an abstract estimation of its safety and eﬀectiveness, but rather on a comprehensive scientiﬁc evaluation of the
product’s risks and beneﬁts under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling.”).
136See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg.
3922-01, 3935 – 36 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601).
25deference that the Supreme Court shows to agency decisions embodied in rulemaking,137 particularly when
expressed as speciﬁcally as the FDA has done for failure-to-warn claims,138 most state-law failure to warn
claims should be preempted.
b.
Consumer Fraud Claims
Consumer fraud claims are potentially the most interesting area because, as some have noted, the FDA’s
recent rulemaking activity does not explicitly reach consumer fraud claims and may not reach them at all.139
However, implied preemption should also apply to state-law consumer fraud claims as an “obstacle” to the
FDA’s program of “optimal use” of prescription drugs.
As a preliminary matter, one should consider the disruption that would follow from subjecting manufacturers
to the consumer fraud or false advertising regimes of ﬁfty states. The risk of undermining the uniform
legal treatment of goods marketed nationwide should be obvious,140 and the Supreme Court has suggested
that it will take into account the interests of businesses and consumers when deciding whether preemption
applies. Both businesses and consumers would be ill-served by the uncertainty that would be created if drug
manufacturers were forced to comply with ﬁfty states’ consumer fraud and false advertising regimes.141
One the other hand, one might initially think that the presumption against preemption applies with particular
137See supra note 95 and sources cited therein.
138See supra notes 57 – 59 and accompanying text.
139Victor Schwartz, general counsel for the American Tort Reform Association, acknowledges that the new regulation “doesn’t
protect a company against fraud” or breach of warranty claims. See Gertner, supra note 72, at 23. But see Requirements on
Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922-01, 3935 – 36 (Jan.
24, 2006) (to be codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601) (opining that the list of preempted state-law causes of action was not
exhaustive); Tesoriero & Mathews, supra note 93, at D3 (noting that the preemption language may have a broader reach than
simply failure-to-warn claims).
140The importance of uniform treatment in a national marketplace exposes the faulty logic of the court in Solvay Pharmaceu-
ticals. Even if a cause of action under the Lanham Act is not preempted, the Lanham Act is a single body of law that will be
applied in a manner that is more substantively uniform than would be the application of ﬁfty states’ consumer fraud or false
advertising regimes (whether common-law or statutory).
141See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 – 86, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996).
26force in this area since policing “fraud” is an area traditionally and primarily regulated by the states.
However, this is too simplistic a conclusion—it depends on the level of speciﬁcity at which one describes the
activity being policed. Surely, policing “fraud” dates back as far as the common law itself. Policing “fraud”
in the context of prescription drugs, on the other hand, was within the purview of the FTC before states
even enacted their “little FTC acts.”142
In the ﬁnal analysis, preemption should apply because (contrary to what the Solvay Pharmaceuticals court
seemed to assume143), the FDA has always policed the economic harm that consumer fraud claims attempt
to redress. The FDA ensures that prescription drugs are both safe and not “economically adulterated.”144
The FDA’s concept of “optimal use” in the context of drug safety also surely extends to cost-eﬀectiveness.
That is to say, if a drug that posed no health hazard at all, but were advertised in a manner that clearly
overstated its beneﬁts, the FDA would surely take action against it. For this reason, consumer fraud claims
are analogous to failure-to-warn claims in the sense that they attempt to substitute a jury’s judgment about
a drug’s optimal use for that of the FDA. Therefore, these claims should also be preempted as obstacles to
the FDA’s program of optimal drug use.
c.
Speciﬁc Relief Claims
Claims for speciﬁc relief, such as those involved in In re Paxil Litigation, should be preempted either as an
“obstacle” to the FDA’s program of promoting optimal drug use or, in many cases, as in “conﬂict” with
speciﬁc FDA requirements.
142See supra notes 12 – 14 and accompanying text.
143See Solvay Pharms., Inc. v. Ethex Corp., No. Civ. 03-2836 JRTFLN, 2004 WL 742033, at *3 (D. Minn. March 30, 2004)
(“[T]he FDA’s enforcement of the FDCA is primarily concerned with the safety and eﬃcacy of new drugs, while the Lanham
Act is focused on the truth or falsity of advertising claims”).
144See, e.g., Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials 88 – 96.
27The one case to ﬁnd that preemption does not apply to a claim for speciﬁc relief, In re Paxil Litigation,145
should not be followed. One should evaluate that case against the background of Medtronic, where the Court
reserved judgment on whether a common-law duty could be a state-law “requirement” within the meaning
of the MDA preemption provision (and thus, whether a common-law duty could be preempted if inconsistent
with the MDA).146 The Court declined to address the argument in part because it predicted that “[i]t will
be rare indeed for a court hearing a common-law cause of action to issue a decree that has ‘the eﬀect of
establishing a substantive requirement for a speciﬁc device.”’147 The Paxil litigation is close to being such
a “rare” case: the plaintiﬀs pressed common-law causes of action to aﬃrmatively prevent the manufacturer
from making the speciﬁc claim that Paxil is “not habit forming.”148 What makes the Paxil case unworthy of
being followed is that, far from recognizing that it was nearing the edge of the scope of the Court’s holding
in Medtronic, the court in the Paxil litigation blithely cited Medtronic for its conclusion that preemption
does not apply.149
In addition to there being no strong precedent in favor of denying preemption, if plaintiﬀs were permitted
to dictate the contents of prescription drug advertising in diﬀerent jurisdictions, it would derogate from
the ideal of uniform legal treatment of a product sold nationwide. This would have a disruptive eﬀect on
business and consumers alike, a result the Medtronic Court suggested it would seek to avoid in performing
its preemption analysis.150 But more fundamentally, it would often contradict the FDA’s decision as to the
optimal use of a drug, as embodied in the drug’s labeling. In determining what manufacturers may claim in
drug labeling, the FDA sets standards to encourage optimal use of a drug, given its risks and beneﬁts.151 To
145No. CV 01-07937 MRP, 2002 WL 31375497 at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2002).
146Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 502, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996).
147See id. at 502 – 03.
148See In re Paxil Litig., 2002 WL at *1.
149See id. (citing Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 487).
150See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 – 86, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996).
151See, e.g., Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed.
Reg. 3922-01, 3935 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601) (“Overwarning, just like underwarning,
can similarly have a negative eﬀect on patient safety and public health.”); Amicus Brief for United States in Support of the
Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, Motus v. Pﬁzer Inc., (2002) Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498, 2002 WL 32303084, at *23
28allow plaintiﬀs to require manufacturers to meet more stringent standards before being able to make certain
claims without incurring liability, plaintiﬀs would be deviating from the ideal of optimal drug use.
6.
Conclusion
The FDA’s recent activity in the area of direct-to-consumer advertising raises serious questions about whether
federal law preempts state tort actions based upon such advertising. The lower courts have begun to address
such claims and have reached mixed results, though non-preemption has been the norm. However, all of
the cases discussed herein predate the FDA’s recent rulemaking activity in which the agency asserted broad
preemption of state law tort law in the prescription drug advertising context. This analysis concludes that the
FDA’s rulemaking (formalizing a position taken earlier in amicus curiae briefs), has the eﬀect of preempting
almost all state tort actions related to DTC advertising. If the manufacturer makes use of the pre-clearance
“safe harbor” for an advertisement, any state-law action based on that advertisement should be preempted
under “conﬂict” preemption principles. Apart from this, claims based on statements or omissions that are
intertwined with a prescription drug’s labeling should be preempted as an “obstacle” to the FDA’s labeling
program, which encompasses a notion of optimal drug use. The FDA’s position is now embodied in a ﬁnal
rule, which should give it preclusive eﬀect. Those who still doubt the clarity of the FDA’s position must
recognize that the FDA acts in the shadow of the First Amendment when it regulates DTC advertising.
Given this, the FDA’s position is as clear as can be expected. The courts should therefore (generally)
reverse course and accord the FDA’s position the deference it is due.
(“Under-utilization of a drug based on dissemination of scientiﬁcally unsubstantiated warnings, so as to deprive patients of
beneﬁcial, possibly lifesaving treatment, could well frustrate the purposes of federal regulation as much as over-utilization
resulting from a failure to disclose a drug’s scientiﬁcally demonstrable adverse eﬀects.”).
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